evaluate most notably research output (normally publications) from designated research staff that has been selected for assessment by the respective higher education institutions. Hence, the subject panels have to assess a broad variety of research that is conducted in hyper-differentiated research fields.
This process can be expected to be extremely intricate and complicated (Sharp, Coleman 2005; cf. Lamont, Huutoniemi 2011) . Nonetheless, in the end a grade system is employed that appears rather simplistic and vague (see Table 1 ). Rating Description 4* Quality that is world-leading in terms of originality, significance and rigour 3* Quality that is internationally excellent in terms of originality, significance and rigour but which nonetheless falls short of the highest standards of excellence 2* Quality that is recognised internationally in terms of originality, significance and rigour 1* Quality that is recognised nationally in terms of originality, significance and rigour Unclassified Quality that falls below the standard of nationally recognised work. Or work which does not meet the published definition of research for the purposes of this assessment.
Sources: (RAE 2008b; REF 2011) Based on the grade system displayed in Table 1 , the most recent REF 2014 assessed the research of 52,061 researchers at 154 universities. Overall, 76 percent of all submissions have been awarded with the two best grades, 4* and 3* (cf. REF 2014b REF , 2014c . This share is crucial, because the assessments are more than just symbolic distinctions. If this were the case, they would be open to interpretation.
Merely symbolic assessment results would have their own potency, but in the end they would be fuzzy enough to be contested, or even ignored -in fact, this is the case with a number of rankings in the higher education sector. However, as it is, the RAE/REF assessments are translated into very robust material classes because they inform the allocation of public research funding by the UK funding councils. The most recent REF, for example, is used to allocate £1.6 billion annually for the next six years.
Eighty percent of these funds are distributed among departments rated 4*, 20 percent are going to 3* research, while other grade scales are not funded (Wilsdon 2015; HEFCE 2015) . This material foundation underscores the vital significance the assessments have for the academic landscape in the UK.
The very selective distribution of funds seems to rectify the quite generous grading that is carried out by the subject-specific panels.
This paper proceeds with a brief review of the literature on rankings in the higher education sector.
It distinguishes literature on standardization effects and on stratification effects. assessments seem to have the effect that researchers stay mostly within the mainstream areas of their field in order to maintain chances of receiving funding. In light of these developments, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine research excellence, since adaptations to the assessment criteriaand panel members' reluctance to penalize their own field -produce ever increasing proportions of 'excellent' research (Tapper, Salter 2004; Wooding et al. 2015) .
In addition to literature on standardization symptoms, a second body of literature discusses stratification effects of research performance assessments, rankings, and the allocation of resources.
Focusing on new strata of managerial accountability, studies have revealed that status assignments create new patterns of authority (Whitley et al. 2010) , for example between panel members and the colleagues whose research they are judging (Sharp, Coleman 2005; Sayer 2014 ), between research active personnel and teaching oriented personnel (Elton 2000; Tapper, Salter 2002) , or between university management and the departments in which they intervene (Henkel 1999; Yokoyama 2006) .
It has been argued that effects of academic elitism and stratification are not limited to the academic field, but occur in other societal realms as well (Maeße 2016; cf. Maeße, Hamann 2016 The rankings produced by the RAE 2001 proceed either from different subjects within one higher education institution (see Figure 1 -1 for the University of Cambridge), or from departments at different higher education institutions that are ranked according to the same subject (see Figure 1 -2 for history). Two aspects seem worth highlighting for the RAE 2001 rankings in Figures 1-1 and 1-2 . First, the assessment itself simultaneously produces rankings for universities (Figure 1-1 ) and for departments ( Figure 1-2) . In other words, the assessment offers two competing perspectives that draw on two distinct levels of comparison: an inter-and an intra-university perspective. It seems counterintuitive for a ranking to operate on two equally important comparative orders. Second, the rank order in both rankings is numerical when it follows the order of the subject areas that have been assessed at a higher education institution (Figure 1-1) , and alphabetical when it ranks the departments that have been assessed in one subject area (Figure 1-2) . A performance-based ranking is only available when the data is downloaded in an Excel file.
Source: (RAE 2001a) Education 2014b) , and subject ratings that rank departments according to their grades in different subjects (Figure 4 ).
Source: (Times Higher Education 2014a)

Figure 4: Times Higher Education ranking by subject, based on the REF 2014
In THE's subject ranking, ranks are mainly assigned by the grade point average (GPA) of the overall quality profiles, which in turn are made up of the sub-profiles for research output, societal impact, and research environment. The GPAs are compared to GPAs of the previous RAE 2008 assessment. THE's use of average points is worth highlighting because it subverts the idea of concentrating on differentiated profiles, and instead aggregates these (back) to simple numeric measures. While the REF itself
does not produce or use GPAs, it is no coincidence that THE draws on a measure that is supposedly more marketable in mass media.
The Performativity of Rankings: what are Rankings actually doing?
Instead of a conclusion, the paper closes with a reflection on a couple of effects and implications of higher education rankings in general and the RAE/REF rankings in particular. Not all of the following points are effects of rankings according to a narrow statistical notion of causality. They can partially be ascribed to research performance assessment in the broader sense, and thus refer back to the literature reviewed in a previous section of this paper. In combination with the literature review, this section also indicates hitherto neglected effects that future research will have to concentrate on, for example systematic disciplinary comparisons and perspectives that focus on the social processes that rankings build on.
First, rankings construct research fields. Any research activity that is submitted for assessment has to be assigned to a subject area, which is called Unit of Assessment (UoA) in assessment lingo. Some
UoAs comprise traditional academic disciplines, for example, physics (UoA9). However, the grid of the (Münch, Schäfer 2014; Hamann 2017) . By rewarding higher education institutions that already have greater resources at their disposal, the rankings not only consecrate and legitimize existing inequalities (cf. Merton 1968 on the Matthew effect), but also further reproduce stratifications (cf. Bourdieu 1988) . These inequalities are not necessarily based on research performance (alone).
The manifold performativity of rankings demonstrates that rankings have a number of effects and implications -in other words, rankings do a number of quite diverse things. According to perspectives in cultural sociology, modern capitalist societies tend to credentialize power with certificates, degrees, and other labels (Collins 1979; Bourdieu et al. 1981) . In this view, rankings create symbolic dominance by commensurating different entities, constructing distinctions and comparisons, making visible differences, and consecrating those at the top of the ranking. However, the rankings that are produced from the RAE/REF are fertile illustrative material because, unlike a number of other rankings in the higher education sector, they go beyond symbolic differences and distinctions. They are devices that couple rank order with research funding, and thus develop the potency to influence and sustainably modify higher education by standardizing research and reproducing structural inequalities. Thus, from a materialist perspective of political economy (Maeße 2015; Jessop et al. 2008 ), the current case example illustrates how symbolic differences are translated into material classes, and how material classes are in turn legitimized by symbolic consecration (Bourdieu 1988 ).
